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AIRCRAFT MORTGAGE




The familiar difficulties arising from differences between the laws of
various jurisdictions may be avoided somewhat by the adoption of one
or another of several alternatives. One is that of using the conflict rules
enacted independently in each country as part of its municipal law. A more
satisfactory way is that of unifying the conflict rules through international
agreements even though diversity of substantive law remains to prevent
complete uniformity of results. The final and most satisfactory method,
of course, is that of treaties establishing both uniform conflict and
substantive law.
These three methods operate in various combinations and degrees
to deal with security interests in aircraft arising out of situations based
on different legal systems.28
6
MUNICIPAL CONFLICT LAW
The earliest attempt to cope with choice-of-law problems as a distinct
juridical proposition, the statutist doctrine, introduced a tripartite classi-
fication of substantive law and assigned each one contact. Personal
property took the classification of statutum personale and was therefore
governed by the law of the domicile of its owner.287 The rule in its
original simplicity has now vanished, except as preserved in the statute
books of some states, California,288 Idaho,28 9 Montana 290 and North
286. ENNIs, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 453 (1953); 2 MIAJA DE LA MUELA,
DaREcIro INTERNACIONAL PRIVAno 369 (1955); 3 RAIIi., TiE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 122 (1958); SCFRNI, IL DiltITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO MARIT-
TIMO Eo AERONAUTIcO 355 (1936); VPRP'LETSE, DERnCo INTERNACIOAI. PRIVADO 617
Q1954); Visscher, Les Conflits de Lois en Matire de Droit Arien, 48 RECVEIL DES
COURS (Hlague) 285 (1934); also ROMANG, ZUSTANDIOICET UND VOLLSTRECKBA EIT INM
INTERNATIONALEN UND SCIIWEIZERISCI1EN LUFTPRIVATRECHT (1958), and Verplaetse,
Sources of Private International Air Law, 7 INT'L & Comip.L.Q. 405 (1958).
287. LALivE, Tim TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN TIrE CONFLICT OF LAwS, A CoMIPAA-
TIVE STUDY 34 (1955); ZAPlIIRIOU, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAw, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 17 (1956); Rossi Masella, Regimen lnternacional
de los Bienes, in ESTJDIOS JURIDICOS EN MENIORIA DE J. IRURETA GOYENA 569, 585
(1955).
28. CIVIL CODE § 946 (1872).
289. REV. STAT. § 55-401 (1947).
290. REV. STAT. § 67-1101 (1947).
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Dakota.20' In Latin America only Argentina 2 2 and Brazi 293 provide for
it in their civil codes albeit in a modified form.
Notwithstanding the firming up in sonic countries294 of the statutum
personale as a result of nationality concept replacing that of domicile,
Latin American 25 countries and most jurisdictions in the United States2 6
and Canada297 embraced another doctrine, that of the lex situs. Latin
American codes express this in two different ways. One group applies the
lex situs without distinction to movables and immovables, and the other
expressly subjects movables to the lex situs. Bolivia, 298 Chile,299 Colombia,300
Ecuador,30' El Salvador,39 2 Guatemala,0 3 Nicaragua,89' Panama,308 and
291. REv. CODE § 470701 (1948).
292. The CIVIL CODE, art. 11 (1869) providing that 'Movables permanently situated
and not intended to be removed are subject to the lex situs; movables carried by the
owner as well as things whose sale or removal to another place are intended are subject
to the law of the domicile of the owner." 2 RoMtEao DEL PRADO, MANUAL DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADo 254 (1944); ENNIS, DERECHIO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO 303 (1953).
293. Art. 8 (1) Lei de introducao a Codigo Civil Brasilciro (1942) follows generally
the lex situs; in regard to chattels carried by the owner or to be removed to another
place, the law of the owner's domicile controls, like in Argentina (soupra note 292).
There is a special provision on pledges to the effect that the law of the domicile of the
person in whose possession the pledge is, controls; this rule was later adopted by the
Bustamante Code, art. IIl (infra note 340). TENORIo, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
(1949), also his LEI DE INTRODUCAO . . . 319, 323 (1942).
294. Particularly in Italy (CIVIL CONE, art. 7, 1868, now replaced by the lex situs,
art. 22, prel. disp., CIVIL ConE, 1942), and Spain (CIVIL CODE, art. 10, 1889). Trias
de Bes, Conception du Droit International Privn d'aprls [a Doctrine et la Pratique en
Espagne, 31 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague) 627, 647 (1930). The latter provision still
lingers on in the CIVIL CODE of Puerto Rico, art. 10 (1889).
295. Obregon, Conflict of Laws in Latin American Countries, 27 YALE L.J. 1030,
1034 (1930); Valladao, Le Droit International Priv6 des Etats Amiricains, 81 RECUEIL
DES COURS (Hague) 5 (1952).
296. Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139
(1868). Carnahan, Tangible Propertty and the Conflict of Laws, 2 U. CHn.L.Rrv 3
(1935); FALCONBRIDCE, ESSAYS ON TlE CONFLICT OF LAwS 471 (2d ed. 1954); Stumberg,
Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IowA L.REv. 528 (1942).
Doskow, Transitory Chattels and Stationary Law: a Proposal to Facilitate Secured
Financing of Aircraft Employed in International Flight, 26 J.Aia L. & Com. 36 (1959).
Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 255- 258, 265 (1934). Conflict rules also
appear in Sec. 9- 103 of the UNIroRM COMMERCIAL CODE (1957).
297. Except in Quebec (art. 6 of the CIVIL CODE, 1866). LAFLEUR, THE CONFLICT
or LAwS IN TIE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 123 (1898).
298. CIVIL CODE art. 3 (1830). SALINAS, MANUAL DE DERECnO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO 191 (1948); URQUIDI, LECCToNES SINTETICAS DE DERECiiO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADo 254 (1944).
299. CIVIL CODE art. 16 (1855). DUNCKER Biccs, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
(1950). On vested rights, art. 438 of the CIVIL CODE.
300. CIVIL CODE art. 20 and 262 (1873). Cocx ARANCO, TRATADO DE DERECIIO
INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 262 (1952).
301. CIVIL CODE art. 15 (1950). SALAZAR FLOE, DERECIKO CIVIL INTERNACIONAL
407 (1955); 1 PAREDES, TEORIA GENERAL DEL DERECHO CIVIL INTERNACIONAL 329
(1931).
302. CIVIL CODE art. 16 (1926).
303. Ley constitutiva del poder judicial, decreto no. 1862, art. XXI (1936); aircraft
are considered to be movables, art. 377 of the CIVIL CODE (1933). MATOS, CURSO DE
DERECIlO INTERNACIONAL PRIVAO 408, 433 (1941); Muwoz MEANY, DERECIIO INTER-
NACIONAL PRIVADO 165 (1953); Villagran Ktamer, Sintesis del Derecho Intemacional
Positive de Guatemala, (29) UNIVERSmAD Dr. SAN CARLOS 7, 38 (1954).
304. CIVIL CODE art. VI, 16-19 (1904).
305. CIVIL CODE, art. 6 (1916).
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t'eru306 form the first group while the second consists of Costa Rica,80 T
Mexico,30 8 Uruguay 00 and Venezuela.310  In all these jurisdictions the
lex loci will control with regard to security interests in chattels, including
aircraft, except where the rule of the lex situs has been changed by
special enactments regarding aviation.
This solution, practical as it may be for chattels generally, was no
longer satisfactory when modern developments, technical as well as com-
mercial, brought about rapid and massive movements of important kinds
of chattels. Not only did difficulties develop with ordinary goods in transitu
but the lex situs rule became utterly unrealistic when the attempt was
made to apply it to chattels which by their very function must be con-
tinually on the move. For vessels and aircraft a new solution had to be
found. It was found in emancipating them from any kind of derivative
contact and replacing such with an independent contact of a quasi-
personal nature, nationality. 11
The use of nationality as the controlling law-selecting device for
security interests in aircraft was achieved in two ways. First, by the
adoption of a unilateral conflict rule declaring aviation acts in force in
these countries to apply to domestic aircraft. Second, in some countries,
by a complete conflict rle subjecting both domestic and foreign aircraft
to a uniform conflict rules based on nationality. This rule declares the
national law of the aircraft to control "interests in rem and privileges
of private origin," as is the case in Brazil. a12 In Uruguay3 '3 it underwent
two modifications. The first removed the private origin limitation on
privileges by making statutory liens amenable to the lex nationalis of the
aircraft as well; and the second exempted from lex nationalis "expenses
necessary for the last flight which are governed by the law of the place
where they have been incurred," i.e. lex loci actus.
306. CIVIL CODE, prel. tit. art. VI (1936).
307. CIVIL CODE art. 5 (1887); ORTIZ MARTIN, DsasFCtO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
(1947).
30 . Constitution art. 121 (1I) (1917); CiviL CoDE for the federal district, etc.
art. 14 (1928). Ancr., DERECtiO INTEINACIONAL PRIVADO 180 (1955). The same rule
prevails in the civil codes of the states: Campeche (art. 14, 1942), Chihuahua (art.
14, 1941), Coahuila (art. 14, 1941), Colima (art. 14, 1953), Durango (art. 14, 1947),
Hidalgo (art. 14, 1940), Jalisco (art. 12, 1936), Mexico (art. 14, 1936), Nayarit (art.
14, 1938), Nuevo Leon (art. 14, 1935), Oaxaca (art. 12, 1943), Senora (art. 15, 1949),
Tabasco (art. 14, 1950), Tamaulipas (art. 9, 1940), Veracruz (art. 7, 1932), and
Yucatan (art. 7, 1941).
309. CVIL CODE art. 5'(1868 as amended 1914).
310. CIVIL CODE art. 10 (1942). "[iFavs PoBE,,DA, APUNTES DE, DECIlIO INTER-
NACIONAL PRIVADO 116 (1957).
311. Cooper, National Status of Aircraft, 17 J.AIR L. & CoM. 292 (1950); also
Etude sur le Statut Juridique des Atronefs, 4 REVUE FRANCAISE DR DROIT AERIEN, 125,
205 (1950); Home, Tim LEGAL STATUS OF AIRCRAFT 34 (1956); Gazdik, Nationality
of Aircraft and Nationality of Airlines as Means of Control in International Air
Transportation, 25 J.AIR L. & COM. 1 (1958).
312. CoDico BRASILEIRO Do AR art. 7 (Brazil 1938).
313. Cornco DE LE ISLACioN AERONAUTICA art. 8 (Uruguay 1942).
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The Argentine aviation code314 contains a special conflict rule dealing
with acts and contracts executed abroad relating to interests in aircraft,
among others "encumbrances and injunctions (inderdicciones) in aircraft
or decreed against them." Such acts take effect in Argentina only if they
are executed in the form of public acts or before an Argentine consul
who will record the document and forward it to the competent authority.3 15
A recent decree-law concerns itself with the transfer from abroad of
aircraft including security interests.310 But the real meaning of the
enactment is difficult to assess with certainty.
without adopting a specific conflict rule Mexico provides 317 that
"acts executed, contracts entered into and judicial decisions rendered
in a foreign country will be inscribed in the Mexican Aeronautical
Register provided they meet requirements set up by article 3005 of the
Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories" and are submitted,
if necessary, in an authorized Spanish translation. By contrast, for inter-
state situations the same Regulations contain a conflict rule:
The acts executed or contracts entered into in another federal
entity will be inscribed only if they meet both the formal
requirements as set up by the law of the place of making as well
as qualify for inscription under the provisions of the Civil Code
for the Federal District and Territories, the Law of General
Means of Communication and these Regulations.
TREATY LAW
Two groups of treaties deal with matters relevant to security interests
in aircraft. The first adopting the method of uniform conflict rules
314. CODICo AERONAUTICO D tA NAcION art. 50 and 38(2) (Argentina 1954).
315. A similar provision in the Uruguayan Aviation Act (art. 99) applies only to
acquisition of aircraft.
316. Decree-law no. 12. 627 of Oct. 11, 1957 (BOL. or. Oct. 23, 1957) concerning
registration and inscription of aircraft with encumbrances constituted abroad:
Art. 1. For a period of three years from the date of publication of this decree-law any
aircraft acquired by a contract of purchase and sale on credit or by other contracts
entered into abroad by which the vendor has retained title to the aircraft for security
until complete payment of the agreed upon purchase price, may be registered and
inscribed in the name of the purchaser and subject to the restrictions arising from the
contract of purchase, provided the purchaser meets the requirements established by
ch. IV of title IV of the Aeronautic Code (law 14. 307) for the ownership of an
Argentine aircraft. The registration of the aircraft in the name of the acquirer as well
as the inscription of encumbrances or restrictions arising from the contract of acquisition
will be registered simultaneously. Once the encumbrances or restrictions have been
cancelled and the transfer perfected in his favor, the acquirer shall apply for a definite
inscription or registration.
Art. 2. The Ministry of Aviation will propose measures to be taken before the
expiration of the period established in art. 1.
Art. 3 and 4 contain provisions concerning approval and publication).
t seems that certain of these provisions have been superseded by the subsequent
ratification of the Geneva Convention by Argentina.
317. Art. 23 and 24 of the Reglamento del registro aeronautico Mexicano (1951);
see note 59 supra.
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includes the Convention on International Civil Law'18, the Convention
on International Commercial Law310 and the Convention on International
Commercial Navigation.20 This same group also includes the Convention
on Private Intcrnational Law (Bustamante Code).32 I The second goes
directly into the field of securities in aircraft introducing uniform substantive
law as well; at the present time it is represented by the Convention on
International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft.
3 22
THE MONTEVIDEO CoNvENTIoNs. The Convention on International
Civil Law of 1889 contains, of course, no special provisions regarding
aircraft and security interests in them but only conflict rules applicable
to chattels generally. In this regard the lex loci prevails. 32 3 Added are
provisions dealing with the recognition of foreign created interests; a
change in the location of chattels involved "does not affect rights
acquired in accordance with the law of the place where they were
at the time of such acquisition."1324 The question as to whether or not
such recognition in cases of hipoteca or nondispossessory prenda may be
prevented by the lack of a parallel institution in the jurisdiction to which
the chattel has been removed, is answered by the rule that "interested
parties must comply with the substantive or formal requirements (requi-
sitos de fondo o de forma) imposed by -the law of the new location, in
order to acquire or preserve the rights mentioned. '3 25 The same position
is taken by the provision that interests acquired by third parties in
accordance with the law of the new location of the chattel but before
compliance by holders of prior interests with the "requirements stated,"
i.e., domestication of foreign created rights in accordance with the law
of the new location, prevail "over those of the first acquirer," meaning
over interests constituted under the law of the chattel's prior location.3 20
In 1940 amendments were added to both of the 1889 Conventions.
The newly named Convention on International Land Commerce Law
adopted new provisions on commercial prenda27 which may be applied
to aircraft in such jurisdictions that consider dealings with them a
matter of commercial law. The lex loci still prevails 28 though a differentia-
318. Montevideo, 1889. RESTELLI, ACTAS Y TRATADOS DEL CONCRESO SUD-AMERICANO
IDE DERECIIO INTERNACIONAL PRIvADO (MON'rEvIoo 1888-1889) (1928); also Los
TRLATADOS DE MONTEVIDEO DE 1889 Y Su INTERPRETACION JUDICIAL (1940). The conven-
tions as amended in 1940 are translated in 37 AN,.J.INT'L L. (supp. 1943). Conventions
listed here have been ratified by Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia and
Colombia. For a comprehensive survey, see ALFONSI, TEORIA DEr, DrRECTO PuIvAno
INTERNACIONAL 78 (1955).
319. Montevideo 1889; translation in 37 AM.J.INT'L L. 132 (Supp. 1943).
320. Montevideo 1889; translation in 37 Am.J.INT'L L. 109 (Supp. 1943).
321. Habana 1928. See note 340 infra.
322. See note 346 infra.
323. Art. 24.
324. Art. 30






tion has been introduced between the underlying agreement and its in rem
effect. The formalities and requirements are governed by the lex loci,
the "quality of the document" by the law "governing the contract,"' 29
which is apparently the lex causae as determined by local conflict law.
In regard to the in rem effect, the lex situs continues to prevail: "The
rights and duties of the contracting parties in regard to the chattel given
in prenda with or without dispossession are governed by the law of its
location at the time when prenda was constituted." 330 Foreign created
interests in the chattel are dealt with in the same way as they were in
the 1889 Convention on International Civil Law, 33 1 the Convention on
International Land Commerce Law33 2 using the following language:
A change in the location of the chattel given as prenda does
not affect interests acquired in accordance with the law of the
State where prenda was constituted; however, for the preserva-
tion (conservaci6n) of these rights the requirements as to
form and substance imposed by the State of the new location
must be met.
Evidently, the requirement of domestication of foreign created inter-
ests has not been completely abandoned, but rather the question has
been shifted from one of recognition to one of preservation. Whether
the latter term signifies a declaratory or constitutive requirement remains
doubtful; but whatever its meaning, that will have to be determined
according to local law, i.e., that law of the place where the chattel is to
be found at the time such determination is sought. Compared with the
Convention on International Civil Law of 1889, the position of third
persons with interests in chattels removed from the original location
where it has been encumbered, has changed in two aspects. First, recogni-
tion of a newly created interest is available only to bona fide acquirers
of interests in accordance with the law of the chattel's new location;
and the second, such acquirer is given no priority since the question of
his rank is to be decided "by the law of the State of the new location"
of the chattel.833
The 1940 Convention on International Maritime Commerce Law
included aviation.3 34 Its general rule is333 that the law of the aircraft's
nationality applies to all matters related to the "acquisition and trans-
fer of property, privileges and other interests in rem as well as of publica-
tion which guarantees its effect in regard to third parties interested." 36
As to foreign created hipotecas, the Convention abandoned the require-
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ment of domestication by simply stating"'7 that "Hipotecas or any other
interests in rem in vessels [aircraft] having the nationality of one of the
States and properly constituted and registered in accordance with its
laws shall be valid and take effect in other States." As a consequence,
rules dealing with the change of nationality had to replace those regu-
lating the change of the location of the chattel. In this respect the
Convention 33 adopted the position that such a change does not affect
the privileges and interests in rem once properly established, the effect
of such interests to be regulated by "the law of the flag [nationality] at
the moment when the change of nationality occurred."
It may be added that the "right to attach and judicially sell a vessel
[aircraft] is determined by the law of its location,"' 330 a rule which for
all practical purposes coincides with the lex fori executionis.
THE Bu.TJAMANTE CODE. The Bustamante Code of 1928340 includes
among provisions dealing with international commercial law a title on
maritime and air commerce. Rules applicable to maritime matters
"are also applicable to aircraft."34' The decisive contact of nationality
applies to foreign created interests in aircraft as can be seen by the follow-
ing provision: 342 "Privileges and real guarantees constituted in accordance
with the law of the flag [nationality] have extraterritorial effect even in
those countries where the laws do not recognize nor regulate such
hypothecation." Thus the Code adopted the principle of unconditional
recognition of foreign interests dispensing with any kind of domestication,
a principle expressed in general rules of the Code.
The rights acquired in accordance with the rules of this Code
shall have full extraterritorial force in the contracting States,
except when any of their effects or consequences is in conflict





340. Habana, 1928. Text in I SCOTT, TlE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF
AMERICAN STATES, 1889-1928, 325 (1931), and 4 HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
2283 (1931). 2 SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, DERECZO INTERNACIONAL PIVADo 348,353J1934).
The convention was ratified by Cuba, Guatemala, ITonduras, Panama and Peru;
with reservations by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela. On the question of reservations, see Muci
ABRAHAM, Los CONFLICTOS DE LEYES Y CODFICACION COLECTIVA FN AMERICA 34
(1955).
The Convention on Commercial Aviation (Habana 1928), text in 1 SCOTT,.supra
at 385, contains no provision relevant here. The same goes for the Spanish-American
Convention on Aerial Navigation (Madrid 1926); text in 3 HunsoN, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 2019 (1931).
341. Art. 282. Property generally is controlled by the lex situs (art. 105), with
additional provision concerning chattels in art. 106; however, in art. 110 and 111 (prenda)
the domicile appears as a subsidiary contact. In regard to aircraft, these rules are





The law of nationality of the aircraft controls "the rights of creditors
after the sale . . . and their extinguishment."3 44 On the contrary the
"power of judicial attachment and sale . . . shall be subject to the law
of the place where it [aircraft] is located. 345
The real impact of these treaties on domestic law depends upon
a variety of factors. In the first place ratification, reservations and trans-
formation of treaties into the law of the land under different constitutional
systems must first be considered. Secondly, the conventions just discussed,
even though creating uniform law, are still only treaty law and as such
apply only to nationals of the contracting parties. Another factor to be
taken into account is the condition of domestic law which together with
traditional judicial practice and the political climate may engraft on the
text of the treaties results quite different from those called for by the
literal language of such texts.
Ti GENEVA CONvNrrION. 8 "4 In its own words this Convention
applies "in each Contracting State . . . to all aircraft registered as to
344. Art. 277.
345. Art. 276.
346. Geneva, 1948, 4 (2) U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1831 (1953); T.I.A.S. 3847 (see note
79 supra).
BAYITC, CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES 71 (1955), also 9 MIAMI
L.Q. 125, 127 (1955); Fixel, International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, 31 (8)
MiCn. S. BAR J. 7 (1952); Giannini, Sulla Convenzione di Ginevra (1948) Relativa
a! Riconoscimento dei Diritti sugli Aeromobili, 16 REVISTA DEL DIRITTO DELLA NAVIGA-
ZIONE 35 (1950); HOSTTErr, L'IIYPOTHEQUE AE:RIENNE 219 (1950); HoNie, THE
LECAL STATUS OF AIRCRAFT 78 (1956); Monaco, I1 Riconoscimento Internazionale dei
Diritti sugli Aeromobili secondo la Convenzione di Ginevra 19 Giugno 1948, 15 REVISTA
DEL Dilrro DELLA NAvIGAZioNE 49 (1949); Wilberforce, The International Recognition
of Rights in Aircraft, 2 INT'L L.Q. 421 (1948).
For background, Calkins, Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation,. 18 Dxv'T STATE BULL. 506, 523 (1948); also Creation and International
Recognition of Title and Security Rights in Aircraft, 15 J.AIR L. & COM. 156 (1948);
Gamault, Le Projet de Convention de 'O.A.C.I. Concemant la Reconnaissance Inter-
nationale des Droits sur Aeronefs, 2 REvUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT AERIEN 1 (1948);
Lachford, Pending Projects of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal
Experts, 40 AM.J.tre'L L. 280 (1946); also Private International Air Law, 12 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 11 (1945); Moore, Some Principal Aspects of the ICAO Mortgage
Convention, 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 531 (1947); Warner, PICAO and the Development of
Air Law, 14 J. Ant L. & CoM. 1 (1947).
A useful comment is available in Annotated Text of the Convention on International
Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (prepared by the Legal Subcommittee of the Air
Coordinating Committee), 16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 70 (1949).
Documentation is published by the ICAO; the most important: Legal Committee
Bruxelles, 1947), Doe. 4653, and Legal Commission (Geneva, 1948), Doe. 5722, also
eport and Commentary of the Legal Committee of ICAO on the Draft Convention
Concerning the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, 14 J. AIR L. & COM.
505 (1947).
The Convention is ratified within the Western Hemisphere by Mexico (ratif. April 5,
1950, effective Oct. 1, 1953), Brazil (July 3, 1953, Oct. 1, 1953), Chile (Dec. 19,
1955, March 18, 1956), Argentina (Jan. 31, 1958, May 1, 1958), Ecuador (adherence
July 14, 1958, Oct. 12, 1958), El Salvador (adherence August 14, 1958, Nov. 12,
1958), and United States (Sept. 1949, Sept. 17, 1953). Mexico deposited its ratification
with reservations concerning "priorities granted by Mexican law to fiscal claims and
claims arising out of work contracts over any other claim." On July 1, 1950 the United
States declared itself to be unable to accept this reservation and unwilling to regard the
Convention in force between the United States and Mexico, 1951 U.S. Av. 130, and
1952 U.S. & Can. Av. 433. Chile reserved the right to recognize priority in accordance
19591
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nationality in another Contracting State."34a 7 This provision contains both
a positive and a negative rule. IThe former is a fundamental one and
limits the coverage of the Convention to situations when an aircraft
registered in one contracting country enters the territory of another.4 s
It may be said that the Convention presupposes a diversity of nationality:
between that of the aircraft itself and that of its location. Under the
negative referred to above the Convention does not apply to domestic
aircraft, except in a few specified situations. One is where a change of
a domestic aircraft's nationality is contemplated. Such a change cannot
take effect unless "all holders of recorded rights have been satisfied or
consent to the transfer,"34a 0 or where the transfer occurs in consequence
of a judicial sale in conformity with the Convention.3 0 Another situation
relates to privileged claims for salvage or preservation, except where "these
operations have been terminated within its (i.e., the aircraft's nationality)
own territory."' "' It may be added, however, that such favorable treatment
is not available to foreign holders of security interests. The Convention
does not impose a duty to recognize their security interests in the domestic
aircraft. In this respect the control of local law remains unimpaired.
It is apparent that the coverage is based on objective criteria, i.e.,
nationality of the aircraft and its location abroad. As a consequence, the
nationality of the parties involved (for example, that of the holder of
a security interest) does not affect the applicability of the Convention.
This means that the Convention may apply even as to nationals of non-
contracting countries. It is true that in most cases the owner-debtor will be
a national of a contracting country since the nationality of aircraft is tied in
with the nationality of its owner, individual or corporate. However, holders
of security interests nay profit from the privileges extended under the
Convention even if they are not nationals of the country of registration
or of the country where the aircraft is located at the critical time.
Security interests. The Convention is designed to guarantee interna-
tional recognition of enumerated types of interests in aircraft. It applies
to the right of ownership, conditional sale, long term leases and equip-
with its national law, "fiscal claims for taxes, charges and other fees due by the owner
or holder of the aircraft and arising out of the service of the aircraft, and the claims
for salaries and wages of the crew during the period prescribed by national law" 1952
U.S. & Can. Av. 433. The United States refused to accept this reservation.
The Convention also is ratified by Pakistan, Norway, Sweden and Laos.
For later developments 'Vilberforce, Report on Recognition of Rights in Aircraft,
in INTPRNATIONAL. LAw ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON TIlE 4 4TEI CONFMRENCE (Copenhagen
1950) 233 (1952); Doskow, Tansitory Chattels and Stationary Law: a Proposal to
Facilitate Secured Financing of Aircraft Employed in International Flight, 26 1. AIR
L. & Com. 36, 45 (1959).
347. Art. XI (1).
348. Language borrowed from art. 27 of the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation (1944), T.I.A.S. 1591.
349. Art. IX.
350. Art. VIII.
351. Art, Xi, par. (2)(b).
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ment trust arrangements as well as to "mortgages, hypotheques and similar
rights in aircraft. 35 2 It follows that both the pledge and the title type
of security interests in aircraft qualify for recognition, including the prenda
sin desposesi6n.
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The Convention applies to these types of security arrangements sub-
ject to two conditions: one related to the nature of the indebtedness for
which the security is constituted, and the other to the type of chattel used as
security.
With regard to the indebtedness secured, the Convention is restrictive
in one sense and liberal in another. To qualify for international recognition
the underlying security arrangement must be "contractually created,"
311
i.e. originate from an agreement between the parties and not by operation
of law or judicial decision. It therefore excludes statutory, common law
or judicial liens. On the other hand, the Convention is liberal in that it
grants recognition to security interests established "for payment of an
indebtedness."355 The broad language indicates that as long as there is
an indebtedness of whatever origin, it does not matter whether or not
it is connected with the specific aircraft, for example, as purchase price,
costs of repair or damages. Consequently, the term indebtedness will
include any kind of causa from a simple debt to a fleet mortgage. 58
Local laws uniformly require disclosure in a formal instrument of
the amount of indebtedness.3 7 Some items, like costs or insurance, may
not, however, be expressed in figures. These items are, nevertheless, in-
cluded in the secured indebtedness as the Convention provides 58 that
"the priority of a right mentioned in article I, paragraph (1) (d) extends
to all sums thereby secured." As to interest on this debt, the Convention
grants equal rank with the principal to that "accrued during the three
years prior to the execution proceedings together with that accrued during
the execution proceedings."359
To qualify for international recognition such security interests must
be substantively valid and properly recorded. The interests must be
"constituted in accordance with the law of the Contracting State in which
the aircraft was registered as to nationality at the time of their constitu-
tion.1360 This provision applies solely to the agreement creating the
352. Art. I, para. (l)(d).
353. See note 27 supra.
354. Art. 1, para. (1)(d), repeated in art. VII, para. (5)(b) and art. X, para. (1).
355. Ibid. Here, indebtedness is translated with dette and deuda, but in art. VII
and X (1) with crdance and credito.
356. From the text of the Convention it seems that the indebtedness may arise
from other than contractual sources, contra Monaco, toc. cit. note 346 supra, at 53, not
distinguishing between the security agreement and the causa of the debt to be secured.
357. See note 118 supra. GONZALES, TEORTA GENERAL DEL INSTRUMENTO PuBLICO,
lItTRorIUccIoN AL DERECHO NOTARIAL ARCENTINO Y COMPARADO (1953).
358. Art. V.
359. Art. V.
360. Art. 1, para. (1) (i).
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security, and not to the agreement or any other ground from which the
indebtedness to be secured arose. Even in this restricted sense the question
immediately arises as to whether the reference to the law of the country
of the aircraft's nationality is intended to indicate the substantive or
choice-of-law rules in force therein. Preparatory materials are not clear
on this point.361 The solution, if any, must be sought in the general
rules for the interpretation of treaties. The prevailing principle would
appear to be that the law of a country is understood to mean a reference
to its substantive law. The main argument is that otherwise such provi-
sion would be a mere statement of the status quo and, consequently,
meaningless.
The security interest must also be "regularly recorded in a public
record of the Contracting State in which the aircraft is registered as to
nationality. '38 2 An interest not recorded cannot qualify for international
recognition regardless of whether the lack of recording is due to the
fact that the jurisdiction of the aircraft's nationality has no registers for
such purposes, or declines to record the interest, or the interest in question
need not to be recorded at all.83
The security. The Convention accepts only two objects as security:
aircraft and spare parts. It expressly provides that it applies to security
interests "in aircraft" without defining what an aircraft is; each jurisdic-
tion must supply its own definition. Government owned aircraft are within
the terms of the Convention unless they be used for "military, customs
and police service."304 In lieu of definition of aircraft, the Convention
supplies a list of its components. It contains the following items: "the
airframe, engines, propellers, radio apparatus, and all other articles intended
for use in the aircraft whether installed therein or temporarily separated
therefrom." '
The Convention fails to answer the question whether or not it is
applicable to security interests in the component parts of an operational
aircraft, for example, in the engines, radar or propellers. From the overall
purpose of the Convention it might be deduced that such partial security
interests are outside of its scope except spare parts which are specifically
dealt with.
361. Doe. 5722, at 12, 15, 22, 28 and 35 (1948).
362. Art. 1, para. (1) (ii).
363. For example, under Florida law (FLA. STAT. § 698.01) dispossessory chattel
mortgages need not be recorded; assuming that another recorded mortgagee knew of its
existence (art. 503(c), Federal Aviation Act), such unrecorded security interest would
be effective. However, it would not qualify for international recognition in case the
mortgagee took the aircraft abroad.
364. Art. XIII; in regard to other aircraft the question of sovereign immunity may
arise. Note, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Government.Owned Airlines, 18 1. AIR L. &
CoN!. 455 (1951). Cf. Bayitch, Aliens in Florida, 12 U. MIAMI L.R~v. 129, 143
n. 100 (1958).
365. Art. XVI, Fortunately, the attempt to insert provisions concerning aircraft under
construction (see note 133 supra), was rejected (Doe. 4635, at 41 and 255).
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The Convention does supply its own definition 60 of spare parts; they
are "parts of aircraft, engines, propellers, radio apparatus, instruments,
appliances, furnishings, parts of any of the foregoing, and generally any
other articles of whatever description maintained for installation in aircraft
in substitution for parts or articles removed." As already indicated, spare
parts may be used as independent security in some jurisdictions3" while in
others they are only affected by security interests in aircraft to which they
appertain. In this respect the Convention took a clear cut position. It
denied recognition to independent security interests in spare parts. Security
interests in spare parts go along with the interests constituted in the
aircraft to which they belong. The question as to the extent of spare
parts thus affected is determined by the national law of the aircraft. The
Convention provides368 that "If a recorded right in an aircraft . . . extends,
in conformity with the law of the Contracting State where the aircraft is
registered, to spare parts . . . such right shall be recognized . ." It
would follow that an extension by contract of security interests to chattels
which are spare parts according to the national law of the aircraft, but
which are not under the definition established by the Convention, would
not be internationally recognized.
Nevertheless, this reliance by the Convention on the national law
of the aircraft is incomplete since additional requirements are imposed
by the Convention. 6 9 They are: spare parts must be "stored in a specified
place or places," international recognition due only "as long as the spare
parts remain in the place or places so specified;" an "appropriate notice
specifying the description of the right, the name and address of the
holder of this right and the record in which the right is recorded, is
exhibited at the place where the spare parts are located so as to give due
notice to third parties that such spare parts are encumbered." Lastly "a
statement indicating the character and the approximate number of such
spare parts shall be annexed to or included in the recorded instrument,"
with the proviso that "such parts may be replaced by similar parts without
affecting the right of the creditor."
Several points emerge from this provision. It is evident that these
requirements surpass by far those adopted in the several jurisdictions, even
those of the most advanced type. The Convention, of course, was not
designed to affect domestic aircraft and interests in them nor* in their
spare parts. Only if it is desired that spare parts are to become part of the
security together with the aircraft, and international recognition of such
an arrangement is also intended, must these additional prerequisites be
followed.
366. Art. X, para. (4).
367 See note 149 supra.
368. Art. X, para. (1). The rule appears to be unworkable since it springs from the
rather naive proposition that each individual aircraft has spare parts all of its own.
369. Art. X, para. (2).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Recognition. The focal point of the Convention is the promise on the
part of the contracting countries to recognize certain interests in foreign
aircraft. Therefore the question of what recognition means is a fundamental
one. The start of this inquiry must be taken from the language of the
Convention itself. It states, "The Contracting States undertake to recog-
nize (a) rights . . . (d) mortgages, hypothcques and similar rights in
aircraft,"' 70 in pursuance of the statement of policy expressed in the
Preamble to be "highly desirable in the interest of the future expansion
of international civil aviation that rights in aircraft be recognized inter-
nationally."
Before turning to the interpretation of the term recognition it must
be made clear that the undertaking on the part of the contracting coun-
tries to recognize such interests is but a shorthand expression to cover
a more complex situation. In a treaty of this kind concerned with interests
constituted between private individuals, countries do not promise to recog-
nize privately created interests as directly affecting them in their sovereign
capacity. The undertaking carries with it only the promise that their
respective agencies, judicial and administrative, will recognize interests
qualifying under the Convention but always in accordance with their own
substantive, jurisdictional and procedural rules, except where specifically
superseded by the Convention. If this is so, then what is the effect of
such an undertaking?
The solution to this question lies perhaps in defining the effect of
recognition. Recognition is a term of art.371 Its meaning is best under-
stood in a situation where no treaty obligation to recognize exists. In that
situation all foreign-created interests, contractual, or tortious, or security,
are recognized at the discretion of the fex fori. A denial of recognition
for any reason is not a breach of international law because recognition
of foreign-created interests is completely a matter of domestic law and
the sovereignty of that law is in no way limited by foreign or international
law. Foreign-created interests may, however, be recognized by the lex
fort,a72 but as recognized carry only the sanctions contained therein. On
370. Art. I, para. (1).
371. Arminjon, La Notior des Droits Acquis en DrFoit International Privd, 44
RECUEIL DES COunS (Hague) 66 (1933); DicEY, CONFLICT or LAws 9 (7th ed. 1958);
FALCONnajiOcE, ESSAYS ON TIlE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 (2nd ed. 1954); also L.LUVE, Op.
cit. note 287 supra, at 146; recently \VIcnsEs, DEE BEGRIFF DER WOHLERWORBENEN
RECITE (1955).
It seems that the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Maritime Mortgages and Liens [Brussels, 1926, text in 3 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LECISLATION 1845, (1931)] adopted a more fortunate language: "Mortgages . - .
upon vessels duly effected in accordance with the law of the contracting State to which
the vessel belongs, and registered in a public register . . . shall be regarded as valid
and respected in all other contracting States"-(art I-).
Monaco, loc. cit. note 346 supra, at 52, understands the provision only as "deter-
minazione nella legge regolatrice della validita sostanziale e formale dei singoli diritti."
Ciannini (toc. cit. note 346 supra, at 39) reads the term recognition in the sense of
art. I of the Brussels Convention.
372. E.g., under the Montevideo conventions or the Bustamante Code.
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the contrary, recognition of foreign-created interests provided for in a
treaty becomes part of the law of the land which looses every vestige
of uncontrolled discretion contained in the notion of comity or its
doctrinal equivalents. Moreover, the recognition of these interests by
treaty is also a part of the country's international obligations enforceable
in accordance with general principles of international law.
Since the purpose of the Convention is "that rights in aircraft be
recognized internationally," recognition must mean something definite.
There can be no doubt that recognition of an interest means the recogni-
tion of its existence. This, in turn, means that the existence of an interest
in aircraft is established in the area where such interest exists, namely
between the parties to the respective arrangement, for example, between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. It is true, the method of establishing the
existence of an interest is not fixed by the Convention. From another
provision of the Convention it may be concluded that interests will be
"established before the competent authorities," 3 7 3 meaning before authori-
ties competent for such determination in accordance with the rules
governing such proceedings. It must also be made clear that recognition
of the existence of an interest is not identical with enforcement of such
interest. In this respect local law will determine the ways and means
available except as modified by the Convention. Once the interest has
been proven to exist, it will be difficult to deny its enforcement provided
it is sought in accordance with the applicable rles of the lex fori.
Therefore, it may be said that merely because the consequence of breach
and the remedies for reparation thereof are furnished by the local law,
this in no way detracts from the fundamental benefit of international
recognition of the very existence of the interest itself.
Some doubts have been expressed 74 as to. the range of recognition
imposed by the Convention. Does the recognition take effect betwcen
the parties to the underlying agreement or is such recognition effective
only in relation to third parties? In order to do justice to this question,
a determination of the meaning of third parties must be made. In a
general way it may be said that a third party is one not directly partici-
pating in the transaction involved. Like any legal relationship originally
bilateral in nature, it may involve during its life many parties other than
those who created it. This general notion must be adapted to the funda-
mental structure of the Convention. Starting with primary parties, e.g.,
parties to a recognized security arrangement, third parties will be persons
not directly involved in the arrangement. Since there may be more than
373. Art. VII, para. (4).
374. Calkins, loc. cit. note 346 supra, at 166 and 167; accord Monaco, loe. cit. note
346, at 56, with the simple allegation "che soltanto gli effetti nei confronti dei terzi
debbano essere considerati e del tntto ovvio, non sorgenti il problema nei repporti diretti
fra patti, le quali devono al riguardo far capo non alla misnra di pubblicita, ma a] titolo che
serve di fundamento dell'inscrizione." but see EIOFSTETTFR, op. cit. note 346 supra, at 234.
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one arrangement of this type in force in regard to an aircraft, the question
arises whether such other pairs of parties become third parties. Certainly
not. First of all, the Convention is unmistakably clear in the terms imposing
recognition of all interests properly qualified. Insofar as the Convention
is concerned, such interests are inter sese of equal dignity, and none may
be relegated to the subordinate position of third parties. It follows that
holders of recognized interests can not be third parties. Thus only claimants,
having no such recognized interests, remain.
For this class of claimants the Convention has provided specific rules.
First of all, their interests may be recognized within the provision of
article I, paragraph (2) of the Convention. Second, there is an additional
provision where such claimants are expressly referred to as third parties," "T
namely in article IT, paragraph (2):
Except as otherwise provided in this Convention, the effects of
the recording of any right mentioned in Article I, paragraph (I ),
with regard to third parties shall be determined according to the
law of the Contracting State where it is recorded.
The rule cannot apply to holders of recognized interests, not even inter
sese, since these interests must be recognized inter sese and in relation
to third parties and, consequently, the "effect" of such interests cannot
be in doubt. In relation to outsiders, to third parties, the provision
considers not the effect of recognition, but only the effect of one of
the prerequisites for recognition, namely that of recording. The effect
of recording in accordance with article I, paragraph (1) (ii) of the
Convention as against third parties is then determined not by a specific
rule of the Convention but by the "law of the Contracting State
where it [the interest] is recorded." Under the latter law, the cffect may
be mere notice-giving or may be substantive.
Compared with the Montevideo conventions it is clear that the
Geneva Convention requires no domestication of foreign-created inter-
ests. This is quite understandable since the nationality of the aircraft
remains unchanged when the aircraft enters a foreign jurisdiction and
by so doing triggers the Convention into operation. Further, under the
Geneva Convention, interests in aircraft will be recognized regardless
of whether or not the specific type of security interest is available
under local law. It is true that a contracting country "may prohibit the
recording of any rights which cannot validly be constituted according
to its national law."376 Yet no country may deny recognition to a
foreign-created interest on this ground.
Two questions arise at this point. The first involves the right of a
contracting country to recognize interests other than those recognized
375. The term "third parties" appears also in art. X, para. (1).
376. Art. II, para. (3).
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under the Convention; the second deals with the right of such countries
to deny recognition to interests otherwise meeting requirements of the
Convention.
The first question is answered by article I, paragraph (2) of the
Convention:
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the recognition of any
rights in aircraft under the law of any Contracting State; but
Contracting States shall not admit or recognize any right as
taking priority over the rights mentioned in paragraph (1) of
this Article.
A thoughtful reading of this text indicates that the first part of the
sentence may be inaccurate. In comparison with the French and Spanish
versions it deviates in two important ways from the apparently intended
meaning. First, the English text uses the words "recognition of any
rights" while the other two versions contain the logical "validit6 d'autres
droits" and "otros derechos". Second, the English text justifies such
exceptional recognition by referring to the "law of any Contracting Statc,"
a language which does not convey what the French and Spanish versions
do, namely "par application de leur loi nationale" and "por ]a aplicacion
de su Iey nacional."
Having thus established the proper text, its meaning is apparent.
The Convention does not prohibit in principle the recognition of in-
terests other than those within its purview. Such recognition may be
extended beyond these limits provided two requirements are met. The
first is self-evident, namely that the recognition is justified under the
law of the contracting country granting such recognition; and the other,
that such recognition does not interfere with priorities of interests recog-
nized by the Convention.
The question remains concerning the denial of recognition. The
answer is given in article V of the Convention:
In ease of attachment or sale of an aircraft in execution,
or of any right therein, the Contracting State shall not be
obliged to recognize as against the attaching or executing creditor
or against the purchaser, any right mentioned in Article I,
paragraph (1), or the transfer of any such right, if constituted
or affected with knowledge of the sale or execution proceedings
by the person against whom the proceedings are directed.
A rapid enumeration of the main features characterizing such a situation
will suffice to show the scope of the rule. In order to permit the denial
of an interest otherwise qualifying for international recognition, there
must be, first, pending proceedings for attachment or.. forced sale of the
aircraft or of any interest therein; second, the interest to be denied
recognition must have been constituted or transferred after the com-
mencement of such proceedings; third, the recognition of the creation
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or transfer of such an interest being one of the kind covered by the
Convention, would be detrimental to the executing creditor or to the
purchaser; and lastly, the interest was constituted or transferred with
knowledge on the part of the "person against whom the proceedings
are directed" of the enforcement proceedings. In these situations denial
of recognition will take effect only between the attaching or executing
creditor and the person "against whom the proceedings are directed"
as well as the acquirer or transferee of such interest on the other, as
the case may be.
The rule contained in the Convention having thus been defined, another
question must now be raised, that of the impact of this rule on the domestic
law. The provision appears to be self-executing and not only optional
allowing contracting countries to enact legislation to give it effect. Conse-
quences are far-reaching indeed. Generally, national legislations have some
kind of fraudulent conveyancing statutes, variants of the actio Pauliana
or the Statute of Elizabeth. Where this is the case, voidability under such
statutes will be severely curtailed since the only ground to deny recognition
available under the Convention is the one just discussed, namely the
factual knowledge of pending enforcement proceedings. This would mean
that recognition of interests cannot be withheld on a ground provided in
the typical statute, such as the intent to defraud. It is true that the holder
of a securiy interest in aircraft need not prove such intent and that it will
suffice to prove the actual knowledge of pending enforcement proceedings.
However, the creditor cannot succeed against the Convention by proving
fraudulent intent. Consequently, holders of security interests have had their
grounds to void fraudulent acts within377 or without bankruptcy reduced
to one, that of the factual knowledge of enforcement proceedings.
Privileged claims. In order to strengthen the position of internationally
recognized security interests in aircraft, the number of claims privileged
under local laws had to be severely curtailed. The only claims to survive this
drastic reduction are the following which are listed according to rank:
(i) Costs "legally chargeable under the law of the Contracting State
where the sale takes place";37 8 they "shall be paid from the proceeds of the
sale before any claims, including those given preference by Article IV." In
order to qualify costs must not only be due under the lex fori executionis,
but also "incurred in the common interest of creditors in the course of
execution," a provision introducing the rather vague notion of common
interest. It is interesting to note that costs which include judicial costs as
well as attorney's fees, will be privileged regardless of the fact that they may
not be privileged, but only assessable under the lex fori executionis.
377. Cf. I1 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
378. Art. VII, para. (6); there may be some doubt as to the exactness of the
English version which uses "chargeable" (presupposing a lien) as compared with the
French and Spanish "exigibles"; see also note 379 infra.
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(ii) "Compensation for salvage and extraordinary expenses indispensable
for the preservation of the aircraft" 379 constitute the other group of
privileged claims. Compared with the costs, requirements here are more
strict. They must not only be privileged under the law of the jurisdiction
"where the operations of salvage or conservation were terminated," but also,
under the same law, constitute a lien against the aircraft.380 On the con-
trary, their specific rank under the same law does not count. The Convention
provides that these claims "shall take priority over all other rights in the
aircraft." This is simply not so. Costs take priority according to paragraph (6)
of article VI; in addition, claims for salvage and preservation do not take
priority over "all other rights," like ownership. As to the rank inter sese, the
Convention provides that claims for salvage and preservation will be "satis-
fied in the inverse order of dates of the incidents with which they have
arisen;"381 and they will retain their privileged status, contrary to the general
principle of recording necessary for the recognition of interests under the
Convention, for three months since the termination of the salvage or pre-
servation; after the expiration of this period contracting countries 38 2 will
not recognize such claims unless "(a) the right has been noted on the
record . . . and (b) the amount has been agreed upon or judicial action
on the right has been commenced."
Projected against comparative materials, 833 it appears that a great number
of claims privileged under local law will be, if not wiped out, then relegated
to a rank where they cannot interfere with security or other interests
recognized under the Convention. In most jurisdictions judicial expenses
appear in a privileged position and, consequently, will easily meet require-
ments set up by the Convention. The same is true for salvage claims, but
less so for claims arising from preservation. Hardest hit are taxes and similar
governmental claims though, in fact, the result will be less noticeable in
view of the fact that no country wants to be a tax collector for the other;
but the Convention may cut off privileged tax claims locally imposed upon
foreign aircraft. Eliminated as privileged claims altogether are claims arising
out of employment contracts.38 4 Such claims, it is true, originate from a
contractual relationship, but the security lien in the aircraft is, in most
cases, of statutory origin. Nevertheless, it may be expected that in some
379. Art. IV, para. (1). The English version uses "right conferring a charge against
the aircraft" while the French text spells out clearly two features, "a ]a condition d'ftre
privildgi~s et assortis d'un droit de suite." Privilege is not granted when spare parts
are sold, see note 400 infra.
380, MACHIN SANcHEZ, ASISTENCIA Y SALVAMIIENTO EN EL DERECeO AERONAUTICO
INTERNAcIONAL (1949); KENNEDY, CIVIL SALVAGE 376 (4th ed. 1958). See also note
227 supra.
381. Art. IV, para. (2).
382. The English text reads that these claims "shall not be recognized in other
Contracting Countries" while the French has the correct version "Les Etats contrac-
tants" and the Spanish "Los Estados contratantes." (Emphasis added.)
383. See part V of text supra.
384. See note 247 supra.
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jurisdictions wages could prevail against the Convention because of a
higher than treaty source in the local constitutional law itself:"'
Rank of recognized interests. The Convention only imposes a generally
worded obligation to recognize some nonprivileged interests in aircraft.
There is nothing said in the Convention as to the rank inter sese of such
interests. Nevertheless, it seems to be reasonable to assume that foreign-
created interests will be recognized as they rank inter sese under the national
law of the aircraft.
The transfer of an aircraft from one register to another may affect
security interests constituted and registered according to the law of the
former nationality. Being made aware of this danger, the drafters had two
alternatives. One, they could adopt the principle of the running-with-the-
aircraft, or they could establish precautionary safeguards available to holders
of security interests to prevent the transfer altogether. The second alternative
was adopted. An aircraft may be transferred from one register to another
and, consequently change nationality, only if "all holders of recorded Tights
have been satisfied or consent to the transfer."3 8 0' This gives holders of
security interests sufficient leverage, particularly where the transfer is
contemplated to a jurisdiction with no provisions for the registration of
interests already constituted, and the Convention does not compel such
a country to record "any rights which cannot validly be constituted according
to its national law."88 7 An exception is established for judicial sales; there
title will pass "free from any rights," except encumbrances "assumed by
the purchaser."
388
Enforcement. The Convention contains only one method of enforce-
ment, the forced sale. In accordance with the generally accepted conflict
rule, this is governed by the lex furo executionisg.38 The Convention has
in addition, introduced important uniform procedural rules, some self-
executing, others optional, resulting in far-reaching changes in the otherwise
applicable local law.
Preliminary to a forced sale local laws generally demand that fair notice
be given to interested parties. The Convention has set up minimum
standards of its own regarding such notice and has supplied them with
rather stringent sanctions. Making the prosecuting creditor responsible for
385. See note 250 supra. Both tax claims and claims for wages appear as the principal
ground for reservations, see note 346 supra.
386. Art. IX.
387. Art. 11, para. (3).
388. Art. VIII.
389. Art. VII, para. i1). In the United States enforcement procedure is a matter
of state law; as an example of the impact of the Convention on municipal law, Florida
law will be referred to. It may be added that, in this respect, state law applies also in
federal courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 69 (a
A mortgage, movable or immovable, shall be foreclosed by a complaint in chancery,
FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1957). McCormick, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure,




giving notice of the sale, he "shall give public notice of the sale at the
place where the aircraft is registered as to nationality, at least one month
before the day fixed"81190 for sale, adding that "the date and place of the
sale shall be fixed at least six weeks in advance,"39' apparently by the
authority conducting the enforcement proceedings. The creditor also must
"notify by registered letter, if possible by airmail, the recorded owner and
the holders of recorded rights in the aircraft '" -92 as well as holders of claims
noted in connection with salvage or preservation, all to "their addresses as
shown on the record," a certified extract of which has to be supplied by
the prosecuting creditor to the "Court or other competent authority" in
charge of the proceedings.
Sanctions for noncompliance with these standards are twofold. A forced
sale performed in violation of these notice requirements, "may be annulled
upon the demand made within six months from the date of the sale by
any person suffering damage as the result of such contravention." 39 3 This
sanction seems to be too far reaching considering the fact that a motion
to set aside a judicil sale may be made by claimants who do not even
need to be notified. In addition, the Convention incorporates sanctions
established by the lex fori executionis by providing that "The consequences
of failure to observe the requirements of paragraph (2) shall be as provided
by the law of the Contracting State where the sale takes place."394 This
provision can only operate in a jurisdiction where the requirements under
local law match those established by the Convention and contain some kind
of sanction for their violation though perhaps less stringent.
The forced sale is normally conducted according to the lex fori execu-
tionis. An important innovation introduced by the Convention is, at least for
common law jurisdictions, the provision 95 that:-.................
No sale in execution can be effected unless all rights having
priority over the claim of the executing creditor in accordance
with the Convention which are established before the competent
authority, are covered by the proceeds of the sale or assumed by
the purchaser.
390. Art. VII, para. (2). Florida law requires a notice seven days prior to sale
"in a newspaper circulated in the county where the sale is to be held," FLA. STAT.
§ 702.02 (2) (1957). The Convention has imposed additional notice requirements.
391. Art. VII, para. (2) (b). In liorida after the final decree of foreclosure, the
clerk fixes the day for the sale, FLA. STAT. § 702.02 (2) (t957) no less than ten days
and no more than thirty days after the date of the final decree. This rule has been
superseded by the Convention where the latter controls.
392. Where the Convention controls this represents an additional notice requirement.
393. Art. VII, para. (3). Under Florida law an objection to the sale may be filed
within ten days after the filing by the clerk of the certificate of sale, FLA. STAT. § 702.02
(3) (1957). Where the Convention applies, its self-executing provision will prevail.
394. Art. VII, para. (3). Florida provides for setting aside a forelosure decree before
sale, FLA. STAT. § 702.07 (1957).
395. Art. VII, para. (4).
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This provision exemplifies one of the elaborate mechanisms of civil law
origin designed to prevent forced sales detrimental to both the debtor and
favorably ranking creditors. In this respect two methods have been developed:
one establishing the requirement of a statutory minimum bid based on the
value of the chattel, and the other,39 0 empowering the authority in charge
to deny confirmation to a bid which does not cover at least the claims
ranking ahead of the prosecuting creditor. The Convention adopted the
second alternative in the form of a self-executing rule,39 T thus eliminating
the nuisance value of claims with no fair chance of being paid.
Once the judicial sale is confirmed,3 8  the authority will order the
disbursement of the proceeds to claimants in accordance with their priority.
First are claims privileged under the Convention, i.e. costs, salvage and
preservation. Then come security and other interests in the nature of
encumbrances recognized under the Convention and evidenced by the
"certified extract of the recording concerning the aircraft."30 9 In case an
interest otherwise qualified for international recognition should properly be
opposed, such incident will be decided by the competent authority under the
lex fori. Lastly, claimants with interests not recognized internationally will
have an opportunity to partake of the proceeds remaining, if any.
The proceeds available to holders of internationally recognized interests
may be reduced by 20% in the event that they compete with a privileged
class of local creditors. In this respect the Convention has an optional
provision permitting contracting countries to enact legislation to this effect
and to set aside 20% of the proceeds for the benefit of local creditors who
suffered "injury or damages to person or property on the surface of the
Contracting State where the execution takes place.1 40 The quota of 20%
396. To this method the Convention turns when dealing with forced sale of spare
parts, note 400 infra.
397. In Florida there is a statutory presumption in favor of the amount bid at the
sale, FLA. STAT. § 702.02 (5) (1957), "unless objection thereto shall be filed in the
cause within ten days after the filing of the clerk's certificate of sale." Such objections
will be considered by the court; however, the filing of such objections "to the value of
the mortgaged property shall in no way affect or cloud the title..."
398. Under Florida law a sale must be confirmed by the court, FLA. STAT. § 702.02
-(3) and (4) (1957). On common law doctrines, FRE MAN, A IREATISE ON Tim LAW
OF EXECUTION IN CIVIL CASES (1888), and TnE LAw OF VoID JUDICIAL SALES (1902).
399. Art. VII, para. (1) (b), also art. Ill, para. (2).
400. Art. VII, para. (5). This rule applies only in regard to aircraft. For spare
parts the Convention introduced a different rule (art. X, para. 3). After confirming
that provisions of art. VII. para. (1) and (4) as well as art. VII apply to forced
sales of spare parts, the Convention disregarded its own fundamental position that
spare parts are not independent security; instead it introduced an unnecessary and com-
plicated scheme [art. X, par. (3)] by providing that in case spare parts are sold, the
provision of art. VII, para. (4), concerning the minimum bid, will not apply ("in its
application to such sale be construed so as to permit . . ."). 'he acceptable bid here
is not determined by the amount of interests with priority over the claim of the executing
creditor, but it is fixed as "two thirds of the value of the spare parts as determined
by experts appointed by the authority responsible for the sale.'7 Further, the proceeds
from such sale will be disbursed so that "the holders of prior rights" (whatever this
means) will be paid from only two thirds of the proceeds (which may be two thirds
of two thirds of the estimated value of the spare parts). This special regime was
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applies as well to "any other aircraft owned by the same person and
encumbered with any similar right held by the same creditor." This provi-
sion exempts local creditors from the possibility that a fleet-mortgage would
make encumbered aircraft judgment proof; but it does not apply where an
"adequate and effective insurance by a State or an insurance undertaking
in any State has been provided by or on behalf of the operator to cover
such injury or damage," 0' 1 the Convention apparently assumes that such
insurance will be substituted by operation of law.
402
CONCLUSION
It is not surprising to find differences in the law protecting security
interests in chattels where for thousands of years the underlying rules
developed purely as a matter of local concern. Yet it is comforting to see
that these differences are far more the result of forces of tradition and
inertia than a response to any real life demand. In many countries various
forms coexist indicating an ability to adjust. Title versus lien as well as
the dispossessory and nondispossessory are far less important than appear-
ance would indicate. Pressures of those supplying financing, especially those
acting in international trade, have forced even jurisdictions the most
encrusted with tradition, into making their laws of security arrangements
amenable to every day needs.
The progress achieved in this area of the law of aviation has been
remarkable. Most of the countries under discussion have overcome the
primitive attitude of the unavoidable dispossession of the debtor and replaced
it with the civilized method of recording an instrument. Other modern
devices of credit financing like conditional sales coupled with retained title
and long term leases have been freely adopted and, in many countries
through special aviation legislation, imbedded as a permanent feature of the
law. A streamlining of the various types of security arrangements is already
under way. Consolidation of questions unsettled in the common law
jurisdictions and simplification of the overwritten statutory efforts in
introduced upon the surprising argument that the "position of spare parts is different
from that of the aircraft" and that involuntary creditors who would suffer damage from
spare parts" should be considered (Doc. 4663, 123). It is available only where the"executing creditor is an unsecured creditor"; then the "competent authority may . . .
limit the amount payable to holders of prior rights to two-thirds", apparently a self-
executing treaty provision. Thus one more variation was introduced. While the rule in
favor of local creditors injured by the aircraft (art. VII, para. 5) is only optional and
as such requires special legislation in practically all countries, the analogous situation
involving spare parts and an unsecured executing creditor for any claim is self-executing,
granting the proper authority discretion to allow payment of costs (art. VII, para. 6),
but not of other privileged claims in the sense of Art. IV, para. (1) and then set aside
one third of this amount for the benefit of any such unsecured creditor. Consequently,
privileged claims for salvage and preservation, if any, will be first covered from the
remaining two thirds of the proceeds for the spare parts and what remains will be
available to holders of recognized interests.
401. Art. VII, para. (5).
402. See part IV (iv) sulra.
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some of the civil law countries promise to provide reliable and realistic
patterns for credit arrangements secured by aircraft.
The interamerican conventions never have had an opportunity to
prove their effectiveness in matters of aviation. The elaborate Geneva
Convention is without any doubt an important attempt toward the creation
of a basic set of uniform substantive and procedural law in this field.
The Convention gives us a warning as well. From the small number of
ratifications it can be seen that too much was attempted too soon. In
legislating for the whole world, the Convention allowed itself to be dominated
by the specific legal traditions of a few countries, some of them more
ambitious than factually interested. Thus it happened that instead of being
the first step in the right direction, it attempted to say in one try the
final word. Instead of supplying a few principles to a large number of
countries, it beclouded a sound basis with speculative niceties. In many
places the result was a compromise between legalistic wits rather than a
design to serve practical needs.
Future action is clear. There is a need for a thorough revision of the
Geneva Convention. This must be based on sound comparative legal docu-
mentation, on experience already had thereunder and on suggestions from
writers and learned societies in the field. The other great need is for
introduction of provisions on recognition of security interests in aircraft
into bilateral treaties of friendship and commerce or into treaties of aviation,
a method equally or even more promising because the participating countries
will be cognizant of and responsive to the real needs of the industry, both
transporters and financiers, in legal as 'Well as economic terms.
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